Xen Orchestra auth bypass exploited alongside unpatched zero-day, Vates warns
A threat actor paired a cookie-based login bypass with a second, still-unpatched flaw in virtual-machine imports to target XCP-ng hosts, Vates says. The advisory lists the bypass as fixed in Xen Orchestra 6.9.2 and 6.10.1.
Correction, . An earlier version said reports disagreed on which Xen Orchestra versions contain the fix. Vates' own advisory says 6.9.2 (stable) and 6.10.1 (latest); BleepingComputer's 6.9.1 and 6.10.0 differs from it. We also corrected the description of the second flaw: Vates' advisory VSA-2026-063 says it does not require administrator access.
- What happened
- Vates says a threat actor has exploited a critical authentication bypass and a separate zero-day in Xen Orchestra, its XCP-ng management platform.
- What’s new
- The bypass is patched, but the second flaw, which abuses malicious VM imports, has no fix yet, and exploitation leaves no trace in logs.
- Why it matters
- Admins running XCP-ng or XenServer face possible root-level host takeover and must rely on network monitoring to detect compromise.
Vates, the French company behind Xen Orchestra, has warned that attackers are exploiting a critical authentication bypass in the software. Xen Orchestra is a web-based tool for managing, backing up and recovering XCP-ng and XenServer virtualization environments. According to SecurityWeek, the same threat actor has also used a second, previously unknown flaw for which no patch exists yet.
How the bypass works
BleepingComputer reports that the bug, tracked as VSA-2026-062, is in how Xen Orchestra handles authentication tokens in REST API requests. An attacker who can reach the management interface sends a cookie that holds an empty JSON object instead of a real token. SecurityWeek explains that the empty value becomes an unfiltered lookup, so the system returns the first token in its collection. If that token has not expired, the attacker is logged in as the token's owner.
From there, the attacker can retrieve reusable login token IDs through a REST endpoint and act with Admin privileges. Vates says this can lead to arbitrary code execution on managed pools and a full root takeover of XCP-ng nodes. BleepingComputer says no CVE identifier or CVSS score has been assigned yet, and SecurityWeek says no CVE has been assigned. BleepingComputer credits Filip Magic and Christoffer Olsen of TDC NET Security with finding the flaw.
SecurityWeek adds that Vates has seen the attacker pair this bug with a second flaw in virtual-machine imports. Vates' advisory VSA-2026-063 says users holding VM-import privileges can exploit it, and that the attacker used admin access gained through the bypass. That zero-day lets malicious VM imports compromise XCP-ng hosts, and Vates is still developing a fix.
Which versions are fixed
Vates' advisory VSA-2026-062, published November 10, says Xen Orchestra releases before 6.9.2 (stable) and 6.10.1 (latest), and the Xen Orchestra Appliance, are affected, and that 6.9.2 and 6.10.1 include the fix, delivered as xo-server 5.211.2 (stable) and 5.213.1 (latest). SecurityWeek, publishing a day later, gives the same versions. BleepingComputer, publishing on November 10, says the fixes are in 6.9.1 and 6.10.0 while giving the same xo-server package numbers; that differs from the advisory's current text. The second flaw is covered by a separate Vates advisory, VSA-2026-063, which says that as of November 10 neither release channel includes a fix and Vates is working on one.
Detection is limited
Vates says the attack does not show up in logs, including the use of the crafted cookie, so it has to be caught through HTTP monitoring. BleepingComputer lists the indicators of compromise Vates has shared:
- connections to 91.211.251.112:8001 or to a Tor onion address
- requests carrying the empty-object cookie
- a VM named pivot2
- VMs configured with a file-based serial port
- unusual files under /etc/cron.d and the filesystem root
BleepingComputer also reports that Vates has published commands for checking hosts. Vates cautions that these indicators apply only to this campaign. Other attackers using different tools could have exploited the flaw, so finding none of them does not prove a system is clean.
In addition to updating, Vates advises placing Xen Orchestra on a dedicated management network, blocking known malicious IPs and domains, and adding a WAF rule that blocks the empty token. It also recommends rotating any credentials that may be exposed. Where a compromise is confirmed, the company recommends a full reinstallation, because cleanup alone may not remove every backdoor the attacker left.