Huntress links malware on at least 288 PCs to flawed ScreenConnect RMM+ extension

ConnectWise has disabled five third-party extensions across about 400 environments after Huntress tied a fast-moving MSP campaign to a blank-key authentication flaw in RMM+.

SecurityPublished Updated
Screenshot of ScreenConnect Access Management
Image: ConnectWise · Source

Correction, . We corrected the headline to attribute the link to RMM+ to Huntress and to say 'at least' 288 PCs, fixed which outlet reported ConnectWise's statement, and clarified that Huntress's remarks come from its published statements.

What happened
Attackers used ScreenConnect to install rogue clients and a malware toolkit on 288 endpoints at 48 organisations, according to Huntress.
What’s new
Huntress links the intrusions to RMM+ versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32, which accept a blank access key when none was configured.
Why it matters
Managed service providers and their customers face a toolkit built to jump from infected machines to the technicians who investigate them and onward to other customers, though Huntress has not seen that onward spread succeed.

A threat actor used ConnectWise ScreenConnect to plant malware on hundreds of machines managed by IT service providers, according to security firm Huntress. SecurityWeek, citing Huntress, puts the toll at a minimum of six managed service providers (MSPs) and 288 hosts across 48 organisations, all hit within 90 minutes on November 11. The Register adds that roughly a third were compromised in the first ten minutes, and that Huntress believes earlier, undetected victims are likely because the attackers appeared to number their targets in sequence.

The attackers used ScreenConnect's remote command feature to install their own ScreenConnect clients plus a 16-file toolkit Huntress calls SCKit, which keeps a backdoor open even if the legitimate connection is removed. The Register reports the activity affected ScreenConnect versions 26.6.6.9747 and 26.7.6.9783, so running current releases was not by itself protection.

A blank key in RMM+

Huntress traced the activity to RMM+, a third-party extension that lets other management tools send commands through ScreenConnect outside its normal user accounts. In versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32, an installation whose access key was never configured accepts an empty one, which would let an attacker run commands without facing multi-factor authentication. Huntress said commands reached endpoints with no matching login activity, and the logs it reviewed pointed to RMM+.

The outlets frame the certainty differently. SecurityWeek says the hackers exploited the RMM+ flaw (and elsewhere that they likely did), while The Register calls it a possible weakness and notes that ConnectWise has not confirmed how the attackers first got in. ConnectWise's advisory, as The Register reports it, says it found no evidence of a compromise of its own infrastructure or a vulnerability in ScreenConnect.

ConnectWise identified about 400 installations carrying at least one RMM+ family extension and disabled five of them where it could do so remotely: Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link. The company stressed that "Their presence alone does not establish compromise." Both firms have published indicators of compromise and advise customers running their own ScreenConnect servers to disable the extensions.

A trap for the responding technician

According to Huntress, SCKit waits for a technician to connect to an infected machine, then tries to copy malware to the technician's workstation, steal session cookies and use that access to reach other customers. Huntress has not seen the onward spread work in practice: The Register quotes its researchers saying the console-takeover attempt failed in every recovered host log checked so far, and SecurityWeek quotes Huntress saying some capabilities were found only by analysing the payloads. Huntress also suspects parts of the C# code were written with help from a large language model, citing unusually detailed comments.

Cleanup is more than disabling extensions

Huntress and ConnectWise are telling administrators not to investigate suspect machines by connecting through ScreenConnect. Instead, The Register reports, they should use other security tools to look for rogue ScreenConnect clients and review executed commands, and remove leftover malware before returning machines to service. Huntress said some hosts were reinfected within minutes of leaving isolation because cleanup was incomplete, and ConnectWise warns that disabling extensions and resetting credentials may not remove persistence already established on endpoints.