SCKit malware in ScreenConnect attacks tries to infect MSP technicians, but fails
Researchers say the toolkit targets a patched ScreenConnect file-transfer flaw to hop from customer machines to technicians, though no successful exploitation has been seen.
- What happened
- Attackers behind recent ScreenConnect intrusions deployed SCKit, a toolkit built to spread from infected customer endpoints to MSP technicians' workstations.
- What’s new
- SCKit's RelayTrap component attempts to reverse a support session and push a payload to the technician through the patched CVE-2026-84869 flaw.
- Why it matters
- If it worked, one infected device could hand attackers a technician's management session and access to other customers' networks.
Attackers behind a recent wave of intrusions into cloud-hosted ScreenConnect environments used a toolkit called SCKit. BleepingComputer reports, citing analyses by Huntress and Blackpoint Cyber, that SCKit is designed to spread from infected customer machines to the managed service provider (MSP) technicians who connect to them.
SCKit is a set of 16 scripts and components. It installs extra ScreenConnect clients that connect to attacker-controlled servers. It also includes RelayTrap, which replaces the legitimate ScreenConnect Guest process on a compromised endpoint and waits for a technician to connect. When a technician does, RelayTrap tries to send a file back to the technician's workstation by exploiting CVE-2026-84869. That is a critical client-side file-transfer flaw, which ConnectWise fixed in ScreenConnect version 26.6.5. Other SCKit components would then steal ScreenConnect session cookies from browsers. They would use the technician's permissions, including the Shared Toolbox, to push commands to endpoints at other customer organisations. Huntress says RelayTrap appears to have been generated with a large language model.
Neither research firm has seen this chain succeed. Blackpoint researchers Sam Decker and Nevan Beal told BleepingComputer they reproduced the exploit against a current client, and the existing fix stopped it. They said the current client "never requested or ran the payload." Huntress says the takeover attempt failed in every host log it recovered.
According to Huntress, the wider campaign compromised at least 288 endpoints across 48 organisations. Huntress believes the attackers got in through an authentication flaw in versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 of RMM+, a third-party ScreenConnect extension. Those versions accepted a blank access key if an administrator had never set one. ConnectWise disabled five potentially related extensions across roughly 400 partner environments. The company stressed that having those extensions does not mean an environment was compromised.
BleepingComputer says MSPs should disable the affected extensions, update ScreenConnect clients, check for unauthorised remote-access installations and review Run Command and Toolbox activity. Both research teams recommend using separate security tools to investigate suspect endpoints, rather than opening interactive ScreenConnect sessions with them.